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loss in excess of 15 decibels was intended 
to be a compensable disability." Id. at 
107, 519 A.2d at 1352 (emphasis in orig-
inal). 
Now, a "disability" for occupational 
deafness claims is merely a loss of hearing 
in excess of 15 decibels as calculated in ac-
cordance with § 25A. An employee no 
longer has to suffer loss of wages or be un-
able to perform his regular type of work. 
In dissenting, Judge Garrity stated that 
the majority's interpretation of § 25A is 
unreasonable and contrary to public policy. 
"The very raison d'etre for providing work-
men's compensation in the wake of con-
tracting an occupational disease or disorder 
is to restore to a worker that portion of 
lost wages due to the physical disability 
caused by that occupation." Id. at 109,519 
A.2d at 1353. Judge Garity felt that the 
intent of § 25A is to provide the much 
needed technical criteria for measuring oc-
cupational deafness and to provide a qual-
ifying standard of 15 decibels as calculated 
in the section for determining compen-
sability. 
While it is difficult to determine the 
ramifications of the majority's interpreta-
tion of § 25A, the decision permits em-
ployees who suffer a compensable amount 
of hearing loss to be eligible for worker's 
compensation while continuing to draw full 
wages. This decision suggests that it is the 
deafness and not the disability that is to be 
compensated. 
- Randolph C. Baker 
Hughes v. Workmen's Compensation 
Appeals Board: PAYMENT OF 
WORKERS' COMPENSATION 
BENEFITS UNDER CONCURRENT 
EMPLOYMENT. 
In 1979 a Pennsylvania Workers' Com-
pensation referee awarded death benefits 
based upon his conclusion that, for the 
purposes of wage computation, a private 
corporation and the federal government 
were concurrent employers of the decedent 
under the Pennsylvania Worker's Com-
pensation Act (hereinafter "Act"). The 
referee's decision was subsequently re-
versed by the Worker's Compensation 
Board (hereinafter "Board") which ruled 
that the federal government was not an 
"employer" within the meaning of the Act. 
In Hughes v. Workmen's CompensationAp-
peals Board, __ Pa. Commw. __ ,513 
A.2d 576 (1986), the claimant, Rebecca 
Lane Hughes, sought a judicial interpreta-
tion of the word "employer" as it is used in 
the Act. 
David George Hughes died on July 3, 
1977, from injuries sustained in an auto-
mobile accident that occurred while he 
was operating a vehicle for his employer, 
Salem Transportation Co. He was survived 
by his wife (hereinafter "claimant") and a 
minor daughter. 
Claimant was granted death benefits on 
July 18, 1979 based on the referee's find-
ings that, at the time of his death, Hughes 
was not only employed by Salem, but was 
also a member of the United States Navy 
and on active duty. Thus, Hughes was an 
employee of both the federal government 
and a private corporation. The referee con-
sidered the earnings from both employers 
in computiI1g wages for the purpose of de-
termining the proper compensation due 
Hughes' survivors. Id. at __ , 513 A.2d 
at 577. 
The referee's decision was based upon 
Section 309(e) of the Pennsylvania Work-
men's Compensation Act, Act of June 2, 
1915, P.L. 736 as amended, 77 P.S. § 582(e) 
which establishes a requirement "[t]hat 
when an injured employee is concurrently 
working under contracts with two or more 
employers, his wages from all of such em-
ployers shall be considered as if earned 
from the employer liable for compensation 
under the Act." 
The Board reversed, determining that 
the federal government was not an em-
ployer of Hughes and determined com-
pensation solely on Hughes' earnings with 
Salem. In reaching such a decision, the 
Board relied on Pennsylvania Nat'l Guard 
v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd. 
and David H. Greenwood, 63 Pa. Cornmw. 
Ct. 1,437 A.2d 494 (1981). However, this 
case was of little significance to Hughes 
since it dealt with a member of the Penn-
sylvania National Guard who was injured 
while participating in an annual training 
program. The claimant, Greenwood filed 
a worker's compensation claim which was 
denied by the referee and subsequently re-
versed by the Board, thereby granting 
worker's compensation benefits. The Penn-
sylvania Commonwealth Court, citing lack 
of subject matter jurisdiction by the Work-
er's Compensation Board, vacated the 
order. 
The Board's reliance on Pennsylvania 
Nat'l Guard ignored the issue at hand: 
"[ w ]hether the federal government was the 
decedent's employer for the purpose of 
computing the amount of compensation to 
be awarded to his survivors and paid by 
Salem pursuant to section 309(e), 77 P.S. 
§ 582(e)." Pennsylvania Nat'l Guard dealt 
neither with amount of compensation nor 
with concurrent employers. Id. 
In addition, the employer (Salem) and 
the Board contended that the word "em-
ployer" pursuant to Section 103, 77 P.S. 
§ 21 did not include the federal govern-
ment. Salem argued that the absence of 
specifically naming the federal government 
in the statute provided evidence of an in-
tention to exclude the federal government 
from enjoying employer status. The Penn-
sylvania Commonwealth Court interpreted 
this silence to mean: 
[t]hat the obligations imposed on em-
ployers and the rights conferred upon 
workers by the Act are not to apply 
to the federal government or its em-
ployees. But Section 309(e), 77 P.S. 
§ 582(e), imposes no obligation what-
soever upon an employer other than 
an employer for whom the injured em-
ployee was working, which in this case 
was Salem, not the federal govern-
ment. 
Hence, while the federal government could 
not be an employer for purposes of regula-
tion or subjection to the Act, it was never-
theless a concurrent employer for purposes 
of determining compensation due survivors, 
paid by Salem (the liable employer). It was 
the intention of the Pennsylvania Legisla-
ture to broaden the definition of employer 
under the Act so as to "[ c lover as many em-
ployment relationships in Pennsylvania as 
possible." Giannuzzi v. Donninger Metal 
Prods., 585 F. Supp. 1306, 1309 (W.D. 
Pa. 1984). 
Finally, the Pennsylvania Commonwealth 
Court denied Salem's request for a "set off" 
(reducing Salem's payments to claimant 
by the amount of federal compensation 
available to claimant). There existed no 
evidence to show that the claimant was re-
ceiving federal compensation. Therefore, 
a set off was not warranted. 
The consequences of the Hughes deci-
sion are to maintain liability on the pri-
mary employer for whom the employee 
was aCtually working when injured, while 
preserving claimant's benefits and wages 
from the secondary employer (the federal 
government). 
Section 309(e) poses a heavy burden on 
the private employer since the private em-
ployer not only assumes sole liability but it 
also provides no methods of decreasing 
that liability. 
-Pablo Emilio Lense 
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